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ABSTRACT 
Since the end of the Cold War an increasing number of multinational 
peacekeeping operations have taken place in Europe, Africa and Asia. This new phase of 
multinational cooperation represents a step forward. This study focuses on the military 
and civilian aspects of the peacekeeping activity of the Nordic-Polish Brigade 
IFOR/SFOR (Implementation Forces/Stabilization Forces) in Bosnia. The deployment of 
the Nordic-Polish Brigade, composed of eight nations, including the five core nations of 
Denmark, Finland, Norway, Poland, Sweden, and the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian 
detachments, was intended to create a secure environment necessary for the work of 
humanitarian agencies. It also was to accomplish the non-military aspects of the 
agreement, within its capabilities and the limits imposed by military tasks. The civil- 
military activities in support of peace operations were new for NATO and for most, if not 
all, non-NATO countries as well. The Nordic- Polish Brigade is an example of successful 
multinational cooperation between countries with different military and cultural 
backgrounds. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Since the end of the Cold War an increasing number of multinational 
peacekeeping operations have taken place in Europe, Africa and Asia. This new phase of 
multinational cooperation represents a step forward. This study focuses on the military 
and civilian aspects of the peacekeeping activity of the Nordic-Polish Brigade 
IFOR/SFOR (Implementation Forces/Stabilization Forces) in Bosnia. The deployment of 
the Nordic-Polish Brigade, composed of eight nations, including the five core nations of 
Denmark, Finland, Norway, Poland, Sweden, and the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian 
detachments, was intended to create a secure environment necessary for the work of 
humanitarian agencies. It also was to accomplish the non-military aspects of the 
agreement, within its capabilities and the limits imposed by military tasks. The civil- 
military activities in support of peace operations were new for NATO and for most, if not 
all, non-NATO countries as well. The threat in Bosnia to the peacekeepers was real. This 
thesis analyses different challenges which the peacekeeping forces of the Nordic-Polish 
Brigade faced in Bosnia. This example of multinational cooperation is now followed by 
other military enterprises as the South Eastern European Brigade located in Bulgaria. The 
Nordic- Polish Brigade is an example of successful multinational cooperation between 
countries with different military and cultural backgrounds. 
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I.        INTRODUCTION 
According to Ingrid Rasmussen "peace operations is a new and comprehensive 
term that covers a wide range of activities. Peace operations create and sustain the 
conditions necessary for peace to flourish. They comprise three types of activities: 
support to diplomacy (peacemaking, peacebuilding, and preventive diplomacy), 
peacemaking, and peace enforcement. The related activities include traditional 
peacekeeping as well peace enforcement, i.e., humanitarian assistance, establishment of 
order and stability, enforcement of sanctions, guarantee and denial of movement, 
establishment of protection zones, and forcible separation of belligerents."1 
To carry out peacekeeping operations peacekeepers have to understand the 
"environment" in which they act. This is especially true because "civil-military relations 
in peacekeeping, peace-enforcing or peace-building operations are fundamentally 
different from those that pertain in "normal" conditions of peace or war. In contemporary 
peacekeeping, the military have taken on new and significant political roles."2 To fulfill 
these tasks the peacekeepers have to understand the historical and political context of the 
area, in which the mission is conducted. 
Michael C. Williams states in his book that "peace operations cover the broad 
spectrum of actions intended to forestall, diminish, or end outbreaks of violence on the 
international scene. They encompass different types of civilian, civil- military or just 
* Ingrid Rasmussen, "Multinationalty in Crisis Response Operation", 
http://www.na.be/publications/comrep/200/at-103-e.html 
2
 Michael C. Williams, "Civil - Military Relations and Peacekeeping", p. 15. 
1 
plain military programs designed essentially to give peace a chance in varying 
circumstances of violence across the broad front of conflict resolution."3 These factors 
have to be taken into account in planning multinational peacekeeping operations such as 
those in Bosnia or Kosovo. 
The deployment of the Nordic-Polish Brigade in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1996- 
2000, comprising 8 nations including the five core nations of Denmark, Finland, Norway, 
Poland, Sweden and the Estonian, Latvian and Estonian detachment, was intended to 
create a secure environment necessary for the work of humanitarian agencies and the 
accomplishment of the non-military aspects of the Dayton Agreement. This thesis 
analyses the background of the Balkan conflict and military and civil-military relations in 
a multinational environment the peacekeeping forces of the Nordic-Polish Brigade faced 
in Bosnia. 
A.       HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF THE BALKAN 
CONFLICT 
The citizens of the Balkan nations did not really get a chance to learn their history 
from impartial, independent, credible and honest sources. "Their tragic defect is an 
obsession with their own history; their hearts are in the past, not future. In the Balkans, 
intellectuals tend to be the standard-bearers of nationalism; in Serbia, this is carried to 
fetishistic lengths."4 
People change their thinking about the world in which they live as a function of 
the information they receive. The truth in the Balkans is always questionable unless it is 
directed against the enemy. The world of the Balkans is a world of superstition, and folk 
3
 Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osier Hampson, Pamela Aall, " Managing Global Chaos", p. 321. 
beliefs, which feeds fear, phobias and myths. Thus, there is not really much room for the 
truth but there was a lot of room for fear, which was the driving force behind the hatred. 
"The hatred that astounded the world (in Bosnia) was engineered, not innate." 5 
Living for hundreds of years under Turkish rule dealt a rather harsh blow to the 
national psychology of the Balkan nations. "The Balkan countries emerged from 
centuries of Ottoman rule with little more than a desperately wished-for national identity. 
Even their religious sensibilities had been nationalized, by the actions of both their own 
intellectuals and the Ottoman regime."6 
History was always a tool in the hands of the Balkan politicians to form a 
collective conscience of the nation based on nationalism, which was almost perceived as 
a religion. In 1889 Cedomil Mijatovic, Serbia's foreign minister told the Royal Academy: 
"An inexhaustible source of national pride was discovered in Kosovo. More important 
than language and stronger than the Church, this pride unites all Serbs in a single nation" 
and one more significant statement from the same author: We bless Kosovo because the 
memory of Kosovo heroes upheld us, encouraged us, taught us, and guided us".7 
Whole generations of Serbs and other Balkan nations were raised under the 
influence of a strong national mythology, repeated not only by the power-hungry 
politicians, but also by the clergy. This kind of education, supported by intellectual elites, 
caused serious damage to the perception of reality. 
4
 Warren Zimmermann, "The Last Ambassador", p. 3, Foreign Affairs, March/April 1995. 
5
 Jasminka Udovicki and James Ridgeway "Yugoslav 's Ethnic Nigtmare", p. 34. 
6
 William W.Hagen, "The Balkans' Lethal Nationalisms", Foreign Affairs, July/August 1999, p. 54. 
7
 Tim Judah, "The Serbs, History,Myth &Destruction of Yugoslavia", p. 68. 
3 
"Nationalist "intellectuals", wrapped in the mantle of august academies of 
sciences, expounded their pseudo-history of the victimization of Serbs (Or Croats) 
through the ages. One of them seriously asserted to that Serbs had committed no crimes 
or moral transgressions at any point in their long history."8 That is why the conscience of 
Balkan politicians is always clean no matter what they have done. 
So far, the Orthodox Church did not condemn strongly enough Milosevic's policy 
and the wars he started, which would be justified from the theological point of view. The 
Orthodox Church neither called for stopping the war nor called for the reconciliation of 
the Balkan nations. On the contrary, the Church was acting in favor of the former 
communist party members and strengthened their position by underlying ethnic 
differences. In 1989 during the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, Milosevic was 
accompanied by black-robed metropolitans of the Orthodox Church. 
Bishop Jovan of Sabac-Valjevo, however, made the most astonishing remark, in 
the 1980s. He said : " Since Prince Lazar and (the Battle of) Kosovo the Serbs, above all, 
have been creating Heavenly Serbia, which today must certainly have grown, to become 
the largest state in heaven. If we only think of those innocent victims of the last wars, 
millions and millions of Serbian men, women and children killed or tortured in the most 
terrible way or thrown into pits by Ustasha criminals, than we can understand that today's 
Serbian empire is in the heavens."9 
If such words are spoken by one of the leaders of the Church, nobody can expect 
the common people to follow the rules. Religion should speak out loudly for such things 
8
 Warren Zimmermann, "The Last Ambassador", Foreign Affairs, March/April 1995, p. 12. 
9
 Tim Judah, "The Serbs", History, Myth &Destruction of Yugoslavia", p. 47. 
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as reconciliation, forgiveness, tolerance, respect for other nations and cultures. Worst of 
all, the media, under the thumb of most republican regimes, spewed an endless daily 
torrent of violence and enmity.10 
B.       NATIONALISM AS A RELIGION 
Nationalism is then a form of secular religion in Serbia which is much more 
appreciated than Christianity. Many of Orthodox Church clergy acted hand in hand with 
the former communists and during the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, many of local clergy 
voluntarily helped to clean the area of Croats and Muslims. One of them was the Serb 
priest Savo Knezevic from Doboj. He was one of the key persons behind the ethnic 
cleansing in the Doboj area. All who were against him paid the price with their lives. In 
1992 he showed up at the Serb opposition party meeting in Doboj, took a machine gun 
out of his jacket and killed every attendees there and poured gasoline down on the bodies 
and burned them afterwards.11 That was nothing new. In 1942 Chetniks under the 
command of the priest Momcilo Djujic killed up to 200 people from the village and 
surroundings of Gata near Split. 12 I can only imagine how strong hatred was since even 
priests could not resist it. 
Nationalistic religion was easy to spread and easy to understand with a clearly 
defined enemy. " A lugubrious, paranoid, and Serbocentric view of the past enables the 
Serbs to blame everyone but themselves for whatever goes wrong."13 Individual 
responsibility and consciousness were replaced by the state's. 
10
 Warren Zimmerman, "The Last Ambassador", Foreign Affairs, March/April 1995, p. 12. 
11
 Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, December 1996, Vol. 8, No 17(D). 
12
 Tim Judah, "The Serbs, History, Myth &Destruction of Yugoslavia", p. 129. 
13
 Warren Zimmermann, "The Last Ambassador", Foreign Affairs, March/April 1995, p. 3. 
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Nationalism gave to the people the feeling of freedom from individual 
responsibility. In such a situation, a politician is always justified regardless of what he 
has done because he has done it on behalf of the nation. It also applies to the people who 
follow him. Therefore, the only driving force which will judge him is history, which is 
created by the next generation of Balkan monsters or politicians, ready to the same or to 
create new myths and to manipulate the facts in order to stay in power. History repeats 
itself. 
The breakup of Yugoslavia is a classic example of nationalism from the top down 
or a manipulated nationalism in a region where peace has historically prevailed more than 
war and in which a quarter of the population consisted of mixed marriages. The 
manipulators condoned and even provoked local ethnic violence in order to engender 
animosities that could then be magnified by the press, leading to further violence.14 
The Balkan politicians led the nations to the point of atavistic feelings of 
manipulated ethnic hatred. "Hatred which sets man against man, and cast both alike into 
misery and misfortune, or drives both opponents to the grave."15 Every single Balkan 
man faces a choice either to be a martyr or nationalist following the government line. 
The Balkan people were raised in the same climate of conspiracy theory. This 
theory gives simple answers to explain the world. It plays on emotions and does not 
require anyone to think. You have to act. You have to direct your anger against your 
enemy. Everybody knows who the good and bad are and the politicians repeated the same 
14
 Ibid, p. 12. 
15
 Ivo Andric, "Bridge On The Drina Rivef. 
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nationalistic mantra through the ages: we are the only missionary men able to save and 
protect the nation and give it a bright future. 
Each of the nations living in Balkans has its own national myths, which were used 
for consolidating their national identities. Throughout the rule of the Ottoman Empire, the 
Serbs and Croats treated the islamicizated Bosnian population with deep distrust. They 
consider them as Serbs and Croats forcefully converted to Islam and disdainfully called 
them "Turks" and hoped that they would return to the religion and nationality of their 
ancestors. This was another myth which caused tremendous the Muslim population to 
suffer tremendously. The Both Serbs and Croats believed that "after a mighty storm, a 
change of fortunes, a long campaign of terror, those lapsed Slavs would return to the 
faith, casting aside the religion of the Turks for their ancestral faith."16 
"Bosnian Muslims had nothing in common with real Turks. But they were 
politically Turks - loyal to the Turkish Ottoman Empire and the Sultan."17 That was the 
way they were perceived. "Muslims change their cap as the wind changes."18 This was 
the wide spread opinions of Bosnian Muslims among the Serbs ad Croats. However, the 
process of islamicization took many generations and nearly 150 years starting from the 
conquest of Bosnia in 1463. 
According to Fouad Ajami "that what helped to carry out this process was the 
fairly weak structure of the Bosnian Church. In some areas, such as Herzegovina and the 
16
 Fouad Ajami, "In Europe's Shadows", The New Republic, November 21 1994, p. 29. 
17
 Aleks Djilas, "The Nation That WasnT, The New Republic, September 25, p. 28. 
18
 Fouad Ajami, "In Europe's Shadows", The New Republic, November 21 1994, p. 30. 
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Serbian fringe of eastern Bosnia, there had been churches acting in competition."19 The 
truth is also that converted Muslims had more privileges than Christian believers, which 
created tensions and hatred based on feelings of either Catholic or Orthodox betrayal by 
Christians. Finally, however, in 1974 the Muslim population in Bosnia was recognized by 
Tito's constitution as one of the six "constituent nations" of Yugoslavia.20 
The Serbs love the legend of themselves standing at the ramparts defending 
Christendom. However, the truth is much more complicated. "After Kosovo, Serbs 
fought Hungarians, and they fought on behalf of the Turks as their vassals and allies in 
intermittent campaigns that stretched nearly two centuries."21 
This myth of Serbs as the defenders of Christianity against Islam is often repeated 
nowadays. The Serb from Rieff s book22 says, " Serbs only have history. For five 
hundred years we Serbs have been defending Western civilization against the Turks. Vuk 
Karadzic did it in the nineteenth century, our leader, Radovan Karadzic, does it now. We 
all do!" This kind of thinking goes back into Serb history and it is deep-seated in people's 
minds and it relates to poorly educated peasants and workers and intellectual elites as 
well. 
In the 19th century, nationalism spread all over Europe by the French Revolution 
of 1789, began to penetrate the Balkan nations. The European powers, especially Russia 
19
 Ibid., 57. 
20
 David Rieff "Slaughterhouse" , Bosnia and the failure of the Wesf, p. 68. 
21
 Fouad Ajami, "In Europe's Shadows", The New Republic, November 21, p. 30. 
22
 David Rieff "Slaughterhouse ", Bosnia and the failure of the West", p .86. 
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were very eager for regaining political influence in this area since the Ottoman Empire 
was getting weaker. Russia became the patron of this process in Serbia.23 
In 1918 Yugoslavia was created from the kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro 
and the South Slav parts of Austria-Hungary. "It was obvious those days that Bosnian 
Muslims were something more than just a regional appellation, and more than just a 
religious group. But the Serbs tended to regard the new kingdom as an extension of 
Serbia and organized it in a centralist manner. Non Serbs, including Bosnian Muslims 
were rightly dissatisfied."24 
The Second World War brought ustasha crimes, committed on behalf of the 
Croatian fascist state of Ante Pavelica, which cooperated very closely with Germany and 
Italy. The Ustasha ideologists knew what to make of Bosnian's Muslims. They 
considered them to be Croats of the Islamic faith. As Ante Pavelic put it, the " Croat 
national consciousness never was extinguished in the Muslim element of Bosnia, and 
after the departure of the Turks, has resurfaced. The autonomy of Bosnia-Hercegovina 
was denied, its boundaries redrawn to subordinate it to the Croat project. Croatian 
chauvinism grew genocidal."25 "Total number of wartime deaths in Yugoslavia was 
about one million, and those about half of them were Serbs."26 
After World War n, the official Yugoslav Communist Party policy was based on 
the ideology of the "brotherhood and unity" concept. There was no teaching of real 
23
 William W. Hagen, "The Balkan's Lethal Nationalism", Foreign Affairs", July/August 1999, p. 53. 
24
 Ibid. p. 28. 
2
^ David Rieff, "Almost Justice", The New Republic, July 6, p. 29. 
26Tim Judah, "The Serbs, History, Myth &Destruction of Yugoslavia", p. 133. 
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history in the schools. They did so because during communism, the Yugoslav communist 
party never really touched on the history of the Second World War. Authorities kept all 
atrocities that happened hidden. 
Officially everybody was equally guilty for what happened during the war. The 
communists, however first took revenge on Serb and Croatian nationalists. "Altogether it 
has been estimated that up to 200,000 people were killed by Tito's mass shooting, forced 
death marches and concentration camps in the period 1945-6."27 
Even communism, though, could not hide its nationalistic face. The new 
Yugoslavia was composed of six republics and two autonomous regions. The republics 
were Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia and Slovenia. Serbia 
contained the two autonomous regions of Kosovo and Vojvodina. Again, although 
officially, there was a policy of "brotherhood and unity" in Yugoslavia. However, that 
was once again the myth. "The country was governed from Belgrade; Serbs dominated 
the Party and the armed forces; and for those who had lived through the war there was 
strong sense that Serbs's record was morally superior to Croatia's."28 
However, the greatest source of instability in Yugoslavia was Kosovo. The 
problem came out strongly after the fall in 1966 of Tito's security chief, Aleksandar 
Rankovic, who ruled Kosovo with the iron hand. After clashes with Albanians in 1968, 
many Serbs left Kosovo for Serbia proper. "Because the Kosovo were predominantly 
Muslim, anti - Islamic sentiment became an ever more important feature of Serb 
nationalism; it had long been part of the baggage of Serbian literary culture, but was now 
27
 Noel Malcolm, "Bosnia, a Short History", p. 193. 
28
 Noel Malcolm, "Bosnia, a Short History", p. 204. 
10 
expressed in much stronger forms, as in fiercely anti-Muslim novel "Knife", published by 
the radical nationalist Vuk Draskovic in the early 1980s."29 Also the Orthodox Church 
tried to seized the chance to "revive the sense of religious identity in the literary and 
political culture of the country"30 using Kosovo. 
Intellectuals appealed to nationalism as a driving force of nation unity. 
Additionally the Serb nationalists received support from the creme de la creme of Serb 
academic society. The Serbian Academy of Science published in 1986 the so called 
"Memorandum" in which grievances about Kosovo were combined with the accusation 
that Tito's policies had aimed at the weakening of Serbia by giving too much power to 
the republic and autonomous regions. In order to make decisions, the Serbs had to seek 
an agreement with the rest of the republics and autonomous regions. 
In 1987 a new strong leader rose to power: Slobodan Milosevic. His first step was 
to exploit the current situation in Kosovo to increase nationalism. This was eagerly 
supported by the media, and especially the state controlled television. In the late 1980s, at 
the height of Serbia's nationalist euphoria, hundreds of thousands could be relied upon to 
demonstrate for "Serbian Unity" and "All Serbs in One State." "Mr. Milosevic 
propaganda machinery used also images from the real Croatian genocide against the 
Serbs during World War II to portray every contemporary Croat as a latter-day Fascist 
ready to throw Serbs into concentration camps. Mr. Milosevic has had a consistent 
purpose: to use the darkest Balkan ghosts to inspire the fear (and fear's other face, crazed 
29
 Ibid., p. 206. 
30
 Ibid., p. 206. 
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violence) on which he has thrived."31 He later on used his power more after the 
nationalist political party's victories in the elections in November 1990. 
C.       BREAKUP OF YUGOSLAVIA 
Western countries were aware of what was going on in Yugoslavia from 
intelligence reports. "Intelligence suggesting that secession of the Yugoslavia republics 
was unavoidable. A CIA report written in November 1990 predicted Yugoslavia's 
disintegration within eighteen months, though the State Department strongly disagreed 
with this prognosis because they thought the U.S. would work it out through political 
pressure and negotiations. Warren Zimmerman, the last U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia 
from 1989 to 1992, explains the American attitude toward that country. 
The problem of Yugoslavia was surpassed by both Poland and Hungary in 
economical and political openness. In addition, human rights had become 
a major element of U.S. policy, and Yugoslavia's record on these issues 
was not too good. Finally, I was to reassert the traditional mantra of U.S. 
support for Yugoslavia's unity, independence, and territorial integrity. But 
I would add that the United States could only support unity in the context 
of democracy; it would strongly oppose unity imposed or preserved by 
force.32 
The other factor was "the pressure from public opinion offended by Serbia's 
manipulation of Yugoslavia for its own purposes. The U.S. Congress had already passed 
legislation in 1990 terminating aid to Yugoslavia unless the president confirmed that 
human rights were being respected."33 But Milosevic had his own plans concerning the 
Yugoslav Federation. 
31
 Roger Cohen, Yes, "Blood Stains the Balkans. No, It's Not Just Fate ", New York Time, October 15, 
1998. 
32
 Warren Zimmermann, " A Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia", Foreign Affairs, March/April, 
1995, p. 3. 
33
 James Bjork & Allan E. Goodman, "Yugoslavia, 1991-92: Could Diplomacy Have Prevented a 
12 
Slovenia was allowed to leave Yugoslavia in 1991 after being attacked by very 
weak federal forces composed of mostly poorly trained draftees, and altogether 3,000 
soldiers and a couple dozen armored vehicles. The Slovenian army at that time was 
hardly more than militia, badly equipped and not well trained, but based on national 
support, it succeeded in driving back the attackers in a week. 
The other story is that Slobodan Milosevic did not want to fight any longer. This 
is why "only" 40 Yugoslav federal army soldiers were killed in Slovenia during the street 
fights. There were almost no Serbs in Slovenia and supply lines for the Yugoslav Federal 
army were too extended to carry out the military operations. Subsequently, Yugoslavia 
was forced to accept Slovenia's secession. 
Croatian situation was more complicated. There was a huge 600,000 Serb 
minority and Milosevic was not willing to give up as quickly as in Slovenia. The Serb 
minority, which was very large there was strongly against the secession. These Croatian 
Serbs declared their independence for Croatia, announcing the "Autonomous Serbian 
Republic of Krajina." The war in Croatia broke out. Heavy fighting raged along Croatia's 
borders from July into the fall of 1991. The heavy fights occurred especially in the 
eastern regions of Croatia, where the city Vukovar was subjected to a full-scale 
bombardment and assault by the Yugoslav federal army. By the beginning of October 
1991, approximately 1,000 people had been killed in fights in Croatia, and 200,000 
people had been driven out from their homes. In February 1992, the United Nations 
Tragedy?", p. 4. 
13 
deployed troops into Bosnia to carry the stabilization plan in Croatia. Unfortunately, they 
had a very limited mandate. 
In the early days of the war in Croatia, Bosnia seemed to be far away from the 
fanatical allegiances displayed in neighboring Serbia and Croatia. "Bosnia's multiethnic 
coalition remained intact, and outbreaks of violence were minimal. But as the 
permanence of Croatia and Slovenia's secession became ever more obvious, politicians in 
Bosnia - Hercegovina had to grapple with how they would respond to the demise of the 
old Yugoslav federation. By the end of 1991 "the government of the republic faced three 
broad choices, each of which would deeply divide its national communities: 
• It could remain in a truncated Yugoslavia with Serbia, Montenegro, and 
perhaps Macedonia. Milosevic proposed such a scheme as early as August 
1991, but the idea remained anathema to Bosnia's Muslims and Croats, 
who would then be minorities in the de facto Serb national state and even 
more vulnerable to Serbian domination than they had been under the 
original federation. 
• Bosnia-Hrcegovina could also be partitioned by Serbia ad Croatia. This 
plan was discussed by presidents Tudjman and Milosevic in March 1991, 
but it was fiercely opposed by Muslims and the cosmopolitan-mined 
"Yugoslav". 
• Finally, Bosnia-Hercegovina could pursue independence, as Slovenia and 
Croatia had done. This course appealed to Muslims and to the Croat 
community, which had a longstanding tactical alliance with the Muslims, 
but terrified the Serbs."34 
When changes in Central Eastern Europe started peacefully and the Soviet Union 
fell apart most of the people and politicians came to the conclusions that Europe would 
not face any conflict in the foreseeable future. However, it quickly turned out that they 
were wrong and old European demons of nationalism in the Balkans were rising. The 
most dangerous threat toward Western countries - the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union 
34James Bjork, Allan E. Goodman, "Yugoslav, 1991-92: Could Diplomacy Have Prevented a Tragedy?'' 
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ceased to exist. Communist ideology, on which all the regimes in the CEE were based, 
died. Nobody believed in it, not even the communists themselves. However, the 
communists in Poland and Hungary on the contrary, as opposed to communists in the 
Balkans, were aware that they could not stay in power any longer and they had to give up 
it and verified it themselves through the democratic process. 
During communism, Yugoslav authorities or the communist party, did not need 
legitimacy because they had the military, police and secret services in their hands so they 
could control the society. When communism fell apart, the communist apparatus needed 
legitimacy to exercise power. There was a need for new ideology to influence people's 
minds. They used nationalism to put the people into xenophobic hysteria. That was the 
beginning of the Balkan wars, atrocities, ethnic cleansing in the 1990s. It was also a 
shock for many people in Europe, especially for those dealing with politics, because they 
did not know how to react and what to do to stop the mass killings. "The hatred that 
astounded the world (in Bosnia) was engineered, not innate."35 
The ideology was their certain form of religion like it was during the French 
Revolution when patriotism was supposed to replace Catholicism. However, in Serbia, 
the Ordodox Church acted hand in hand with the former communists and therefore, 
strengthened its legitimacy. Ideology to be widely accepted, must be understandable with 
a clearly defined enemy. Individual responsibility must be replaced by the state's and a 
better life must be promised. This is what Milosevic's nationalism gave to the Serb 
people. 
35
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Bosnia's experience had changed the view of European politics since Europe 
itself was not able to do anything to stop that small war. Most of the people realized how 
passive and powerless was Europe and was not even able to cross their borders of 
selfishness and interests. 
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II.     INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY TOWARD PEACE 
A.       US AND UE EFFORT TO STOP THE CONFLICT 
The United States, Russia and the EU were the main actors on the political scene 
wanted to influence the situation in the Balkans and to stop the war. According to 
Richard Holbrooke "it was president George Bush who, during 1990 and 1991, largely 
ignored the ample signs of Yugoslavia's collapse; it was president George Bush who 
after the Serbs attacked the Slovens during July 1991, and despite changes enacted only 
seven months before that had explicitly made such "crisis management" part of the 
alliance's mission, chose to "hand off the conflict to the Europeans-and to the military 
toothless European Union, not NATO."36 
The Bush administration did not have a plan on how to solve the emerging 
problems. National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft said that the president would 
frequently ask him, "Tell me again what this is all about. He saw no US interests engaged 
in Bosnia, and his European allies reinforced his skepticism."37 
Secretary of State James A. Baker JJI believed he " was talking to a wall with a 
crew cut after meeting with Milosevic in Belgrade in June 1991 to warn him against 
"exploitation of ethnic resentments and failure to respect human rights in Kosovo" - 
complaints that could be lifted from today's."38 
36
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The European Community did not have unanimity." This is the hour of Europe!" 
- cried the egregious Jacques Poos, foreign minister of Luxembourg, when Yugoslavian 
President Slobodan Milisevic's army first opened fire in Slovenia and Croatia in the 
summer of 1991. " We do not interfere in American affairs; we trust that America will 
not interfere in European affairs," said Jacques Delors, voicing the only consistent and 
distinctive theme of "European" foreign policy: graceless anti-Americanism.39 
When the war started in Croatia the EC continued to try to broker a lasting cease - 
fire and peacekeeping arrangement in Croatia. However, the fights were much more 
fierce. Cease- fires negotiated under the EC mediation lasted only weeks, days, or even 
hours before one or the other side broke them. The EC wanted Yugoslav republics to stay 
together in one state but it turned out to be impossible. 
The EC policy toward Yugoslavia was unfortunate and based on wrong premises 
and when those failed, the EC did not have the military power to efficiently stop the war 
in Yugoslavia. The immaturity of the foreign policy of the EC, which tried to represent 
all of Western Europe was visible with the naked eye. 
The EC's decision to recognize the seceding Yugoslav republics brought to a 
close that organization's role as preeminent mediator in the Yugoslav conflict, though the 
Community, and Lord Carrington in particular, would continue to play a role in 
negotiations. The institution that began to share the mediating role and succeeded to the 
peacekeeping role in Yugoslavia was the United Nations.40 
39
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B.       DEPLOYMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
In February 1992, the United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) deployed 
troops into Bosnia to carry out the stabilization plan in Croatia. In March 1992, voters in 
Bosnia overwhelmingly approved independence. By the end of spring 1992, Bosnian 
Serbs, who had significant arsenal at their disposal, begun forcible resistance to Bosnia's 
independence and controlled more than 60 per cent of Bosnia's territory. 
In April 1992, the EU recognized Bosnia as an independent state. All three former 
republics, which seceded from the Yugoslav Federation and declared their independence, 
were admitted to the UN. At the same time Serbs were continuing their aggression. The 
UN Security Council imposed economic sanctions against Serbia at the end of May. A 
second UN contingent was deployed in June 1992 to monitor the numerous cease-fires 
that were periodically declared in Bosnia. 
Since the war in Bosnia started, systematical ethnic cleansing begun. It was a 
planned operation of mass killings in order to terrify the rest of the population and 
disseminated this information in order to force the other minorities to leave before Serb 
forces came to the area. There were 4,377 million inhabitants in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 
1991 before the war started. Now there are about 3 million people. Over 200,00 people 
had been killed41 and 54 per cent left their houses: 1.4 million were expelled and 1.3 
million escaped from the area. The greatest victims of ethnic expulsion were the Muslims 
who had as many as 1 million refuges. 
The UN study reports suggest a common method of initial apprehension and 
identification of those non-Serbs detained for ultimate disposition, either, long-term 
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detention, deportation, or execution. A common plan is also suggested by the 
implementation of a system whereby prisoners were detained, classified, and subjected to 
similar types of abuse (e.g., it was often reported that intellectuals, politicians, police, 
and the wealthy were regularly tortured and killed in certain camps).42 
In February 1994, in response to a Bosnian Serb mortar attack killing 68 civilians 
in a Sarajevo marketplace, NATO issued an ultimatum that if Bosnian Serb heavy 
weapons were not withdrawn from UN monitored exclusion zones around the capital, 
Bosnian Serb forces would be subject to air strikes. Three months later, NATO employed 
its first air strikes against Bosnian Serb forces to stop a Serb attack on the eastern enclave 
of a UN safe area of Gorazde. 
In the early autumn of 1995, the Serbs had suffered military setbacks. They used 
to have superiority in heavy weapons but in those days their infantry and equipment were 
overstretched. There also was a different attitude in the UN and NATO caused by 
reported atrocities against the Muslims, ruined economies, and weariness among the 
civilian population. 
The Srebrenica massacre in July 1995 finally forced the international community 
to act firmly. It was the worst war crime in Europe, since those of the Nazis-made 
UNPROFOR's ignominy complete. The myth of a greater Serbia led to the Srebrenica 
case where "within thirty hours, little more than a single day, Mladic's men had expelled 
41 "The Black Book", by the writers and editors of "The New Republic", p. 58. 
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to Muslim territory 23,000 women and children; within five days they had murdered 
more than 7,000 men."43 
The United Nations mandate was very limited and inside there were different 
opinions within the UN when it came to the use of force. The Secretary General's report 
admits to" pervasive ambivalence within the United Nations regarding the role of force in 
the pursuit of peace" and to " an institutional ideology of impartiality even when 
confronted with attempted genocide." It also confesses that " we were, with hindsight, 
wrong to declare repeatedly and publicly that we did not want to use air power against the 
Serbs except as a last resort, and to accept the shelling of the safe areas as a daily 
occurrence."44 
That was the most significant failure in UN history. The United Nations 
experience in Bosnia was one of the most difficult in history, which was stated in an 
official UN statement." The fall of Srebrenica also is shocking because the enclave's 
inhabitants believed that the authority of the United Nations Security Council, the 
presence of UNPROFOR peacekeepers, and the might of NATO air power would ensure 
their safety. 
Instead, the Serb forces ignored the Security Council, pushed aside the 
UNPROFOR troops, and assessed correctly that air power would not be used to stop 
them. They overran the safe area of Srebrenica with ease, and then proceeded to 
depopulate the territory within 48 hours. Their leaders then engaged in high-level 
43
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negotiations with representatives of the international community while their forces on the 
ground executed and buried thousands of men and boys within a matter of days."45 
United States diplomacy was seeking a solution to the conflict. All these efforts 
led to a peace agreement, signed by representatives of all sides involved in the Bosnian 
war in November 1995 in Dayton, Ohio. 
On November 16, 1995, Lieutenant General Wesley Clark was in Dayton, Ohio. 
Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic and other US officials were watching on a 
PowerScene virtual reality imagining system three-dimensional scenes of the hills of 
Bosnia east of Sarajevo. They tried to draw a computer path leading from the besieged 
Bosnian capital to Gorazde, a UN "safe area" surrounded by Bosnian Serbs. 
The Bosnian war was approaching its end while the final outcome of the peace 
talks had not yet been achieved. Winning an accord in Bosnia was not easy. Dayton took 
considerable diplomatic skills and tenacity. However, according to many, the Balkan 
conflict might have been avoided if the international diplomacy was more firm and 
decided. 
The agreement was officially confirmed in Paris on the 14th of December 1995. 
On the 20th the authority was formally transferred from the United Nation Protection 
Forces (UNPROFOR) to the Implementation Forces of NATO (IFOR). 
45
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C.       DAYTON AGREEMENT 
According to NATO documents "the political basis for the Alliance's role in the 
former Yugoslavia was established at the North Atlantic Council meeting in a Ministerial 
session in Oslo, in June 1992. At that time NATO Foreign Ministers announced their 
readiness to support, on a case by case basis, in accordance with their own procedures, 
peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) (subsequently renamed the Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe(OSCE)). This included making available Alliance resources and 
expertise for peacekeeping operations."46 
NATO countries were putting serious political pressure on Yugoslavia, which go 
together with military preparations. "Between 1992 and 1995, the Alliance took several 
key decisions, which led to operations both by NATO naval forces, in conjuction with 
Western European Union, to monitor and subsequently enforce the UN embargo and 
sanctions in the Adriatic; and by NATO air force, first to monitor and than to enforce, the 
UN no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina. Decisive action by the Alliance in support of 
the UN in the former Yugoslavia, together with a determined diplomatic effort, broke the 
siege of Sarajevo, led to a genuine cease-fire and made a negotiated solution to conflict 
possible in autumn 1995."47 
When the negotiations at Dayton culminated in the peace agreement, the way was 
open for the first out-of-area deployment of NATO troops since the Organization's 
founding in April 1949. Under the peace agreement, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) 
46 "NATO's Role in Bringing Peace to the Former Yugoslavia", 
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authorized the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), on the 1st of December 
1995, to deploy enabling forces into Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
On the same day, SACEUR tasked the Commander in chief of Southern Europe to 
assume control over assigned NATO land, air and maritime forces as Commander IFOR. 
On the 5th of December the NATO Foreign Defense Ministers agreed to the military plan 
for the Implementation Force (IFOR). On the same day, the acting Secretary General 
announced that 14 non-NATO countries that had expressed interest would contribute to 
the IFOR.48 
The Peace Agreement was formally signed on 14 December 1995. The day after 
the United Nations Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 
adopted Resolution 1031. This resolution authorized the member's states to establish a 
multinational military Peace Implementation Force under a common command and 
composed of ground, air and maritime units of NATO and non-NATO to start Operation 
"Joint Endeavor" with the deployment of main forces into Bosnia. 
The mission of the IFOR/SFOR was and actually still is, to monitor and if 
necessary, enforce compliance with the military aspects of the Dayton Agreement. The 
military tasks include: 
• To establish self-defense and freedom of movement 
• To supervise marking of the zone of separation (ZOS) and the boundaries 
between the parties to the conflict 
• To monitor and enforce the withdrawal of forces to their territories and the 




 The Memory Book of the Nordic- Polish Bde p. 7. 
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• To establish joint military commissions 
D.       ORGANIZATION AND THE STRUCTURE OF IFOR/SFOR 
The Joint Operation Center of IFOR/SFOR is located in Sarajevo and is the main 
headquarters for all SFOR operations. It is subordinated to the NATO command Allied 
Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH), which like Allied Forces central Europe 
(AFCENT) and Allied Forces North -West Europe (AFNORTHWEST) reports directly to 
the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) at SHAPE. AFSOUTH is the 
superior command. Apart from two maritime components (COMNAVSOUTH) and 
COMSTRIKESOUTH) and the air component (COMAJRSOUTH), SFOR is mainly 
made up from the Allied Rapid Reaction Corp (ARRC) which for this operation is put 
under the command of AFSOUTH and provides the ground units.49 
From among the divisions it commands, ARRC chose three formations designated 
as Multinational Division South -West (MNDSW-based on 3rd United Kingdom 
Division); Multinational Division North (MNDN-based on Task Force Eagle Division); 
and Multinational Division South-East (MNDSE-based on French Division). 
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m.    ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS OF THE NORDIC-POLISH 
BRIGADE 
A.       THE BEGINNINGS OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
The Nordic-Polish Brigade (NPB) was located in the American sector of the 
Multinational Division North (MNDN) from December 1995. It was an element in the 
United States that led the Task Force Eagle TFE, which was one of the three divisions of 
NATO/IFOR/SFOR in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. "Task Force Eagle" 
began its history following the 1995 NATO-imposed cease-fire, halting the destructive 
four year Balkan conflict. After the General Framework Agreement for Peace was signed 
on 14 December 1995, the U.S. First Armored Division, as part of NATO's Allied 
Command Europe, Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), was ordered to Bosnia-Herzegovina 
as part of Operation Joint Endeavor. 
The TFE assumed control of its area of responsibility during a transfer of 
authority ceremony with United Nations forces at Eagle base, Tuzla on 20 December 
1995. After the historical bridging of the Sava river on 31 December 1995 the Old 
Ironsides Division, with supporting forces from the V U.S. Corps, was joined by the 
Nordic-Polish, Turkish and Russian brigades. In total, there were 12 nations: Estonia, 
Latvia, Finland, Poland, Denmark, Lithuania, Norway, Iceland, Sweden, Russia, Turkey 
and United States.50 
These countries formed brigades and battalions and their troops enforced the 
cease fire, supervised the marking of boundaries, and the zone of separation, between the 
50
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former warring factions. They also enforced the withdrawal of the combatants to their 
barracks, and the movement of the heavy weapons to designated storage sites, which they 
subsequently monitored. 
According to NATO documents "since the end of the Cold War, the number of 
crisis response operations has increased tremendously. It is fair to say that future security 
challenges lie not only in territorial defense but in the ability of the international 
community to respond to crisis situations. NATO has long recognized the importance of 
crisis management in European security, incorporating out-of-area crisis response 
missions into its 1991 Strategic Concept and reaffirming this commitment in the 1999 
Strategic Concept."51 
The start towards a creation of a Nordic-Polish Brigade goes back to February of 
1991, when the UN Security Council established the United Nations Protection Force 
(UNPROFOR). The plan was to deploy into Croatia and secure so-called "Protected 
Areas. "The establishment of UNPROFOR was originally intended to be restricted to the 
territory of Croatia, but was gradually expanded to Macedonia and later to Bosnia. 
At the meeting early in July 1993, the Nordic Ministers of Defense, (Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden) decided to set up a Nordic Contingent in Tuzla. This contingent, 
consisting of a combined Nordic Battalion with different support units, was the nucleus 
of the Nordic-Polish Brigade. 
As the situation in Bosnia went from bad to worse during the summer of 1995, 
especially the fall of "Safe areas" like Srebrenica and Zepa, it led to stronger US 
51
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involvement. Planning within NATO for the Implementation Force (IFOR) was in 
progress. As NATO step by step released the contingency plan for IFOR, the Nordic 
Countries realized that the Nordic Contingent in Tuzla was too small. NATO requested a 
brigade structure operating within a division framework. 
B.       POLAND AS A PART OF THE BRIGADE 
Based upon this requirement, the Nordic countries started intense discussions to 
try to reach a common goal and to continue the Nordic co-operation. However, it soon 
became evident that the Nordic Countries would not be able to set up and maintain a 
Brigade structure alone, so the Nordic politicians started to seek the necessary support 
from other countries at the end of 1995. 
However, to include a non- Nordic Country required some thought. In the end, 
Denmark became the driving force to get Poland included in the co-operation as Poland 
was already a participant in the Partnership for Peace program and a potential NATO 
member. The Poles had extensive experience in peacekeeping operations. "Poland is the 
one of world's 10 biggest contributors of personnel to the peacekeeping missions. Since 
1953 it has taken part in 38 such missions in different regions of the world. Altogether, 
more than 30,000 soldiers and civilians have taken part in those efforts."52 Poland 
responded positively, and the co-operation functioned very well from the very beginning 
of the creation of the Nordic-Polish Brigade. 
"Poland contributed a total of 670 troops to IFOR and 500 to SFOR. Although 
there was not much time to prepare for the operation, the 16th Airborne Battalion - as 
part of a Nordic-Polish Brigade, which was subordinated to the U.S. 1st Infantry Division 
52
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in Tuzla, Bosnia - provided the core of Poland's contribution. To provide proper 
logistical support for NORDPOL, the Poles attached 24 officers (18 during SFOR) to the 
Nordic Support Group in Pecs, Hungary. The Poles used the 16th Airborne Battalion 
because it was the only unit with indigenous logistics. As a result, Poland in now 
restructuring its forces to bring logistics to the brigade level, and in the future to the 
battalion level."53 
Poland also experienced financial burdens because of the operation. "In March 
1996, when costs skyrocketed to 72 million zlotys ($26 million US) and it was unclear 
where the money would come from, the defense ministry cut purchases, reduced the 
number of recruits by 6,000, and trimmed many PfP exercises and programs. Legal 
changes have now been implemented so that Polish units can be sent abroad in the 
future."54 
The successful cooperation with Poland paved the way for Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania, to contribute to the Brigade. Starting on 15 December 1995, the first brigade 
staff conducted their very first training. The brigade commander, Danish Brigadier Finn 
Saermark-Thomsen and a handful of his staff were deployed by 20 December, and 10 
January through 8 February, the rest of the brigade staff was deployed. There were 88 
officers. US personnel also were attached to the staff. 
The battalions that initially came were mechanized battalions from Denmark, 
Sweden and Poland, with one Engineer Battalion from Finland and one Logistics 
Battalion from Norway. Denmark set up the HQ-coy, Norway the Medical Support 
53
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Company and the nations decided to work together in the Military Police Company. The 
working conditions for the staff were very poor. The commander and his advanced party 
were situated near the Swedish Battalion HQ in a small restaurant (VITA VILLAN) and 
with two additional containers. The rest of the staff took up positions in Teslic, at Hotel 
Kardial, which today is HQ for the Polish Battalion. 
Most of the personnel from the Nordic countries were reservists. Finland's 
contribution, for example, made up of more than 90 per cent reservists. There were six 
times more volunteers than needed. One of the first tasks of the Finnish Construction 
Battalion was to repair the headquarters building. Other work now includes providing the 
brigade with accommodations, offices and road repair. 
The Polish Battalion in particular needed assistance because it was in a new area 
of operations, unlike the Swedish battalion with its accommodations from the 
UNPROFOR days. Some elements in the Finnish Construction Battalion were used for 
reconnaissance and patrolling. Mine clearance was done by the former warring factions 
and monitored by the brigade, though it sometimes also had to clear mines in its own area 
of operations. 
These facilities were of course not satisfactory for the staff, or for the units. 
Looking for better facilities was an ongoing project. Finally, the seizure of Doboj 
barracks solved the situation. In late January 1996, the work started to obtain the proper 
facilities in the VRS ( Serb Military Forces) barracks in Doboj. The barracks were in bad 
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condition after three years of fighting. The conditions eventually were tolerable and 
moving in started on 8 February.55 
In the meantime, the battalions were fully occupied making life easier for 
themselves. The Danes who had, and still have, the greatest contingent established in the 
two camps of Dannevirke and Valhalla. The Swedes in Tuzla, the Poles in Teslic and 
Zepce, the Norwegians in Modrica and the Finns built up a totally new camp in Doboj 
and named it after their Commander Jussi Kilpiä. 
C.       INTERNAL PROBLEMS 
The main support element for the Brigade, the Nordic Support Group contained a 
multinational element and national elements for each contributing nation, was established 
in Pecs, Hungary. Over the years, several changes and developments have occurred. 
When IFOR became SFOR, in December of 1996, the Norwegians recalled the Logistics 
Battalion and replaced it with a Mechanized Infantry Battalion, and in June of 1998, the 
Finns reorganized their Engineer Battalion into a Mechanized Infantry Battalion, and 
obtained their own area of responsibility. From September 1998 on the former rifle 
platoon from Estonia (ESTPLA) and the full rifle company from the Baltic Battalion with 
some support units - BALTCON - is now a component of the Danish Battalion. As of 1 
October 1998, Norway recalled the Medical Support Company, and the tasks were taken 
over by Sweden. 
The Brigade Headquarters was established on 8 February in the former military 
barracks on the west side of Doboj and designated the North Pole Barracks. It previously 
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was located in Ljubace, together with the Swedish battalion. The whole brigade was 
completely deployed and operational in mid-February, when the last element, the main 
body of the Finish Construction Unit arrived. The brigade was renamed the Nordic-Polish 
Brigade (NordPol BDE) on 10 February. The previous name was the Nordic Brigade.56 
The brigade staff was a special organization. Getting approximately 70 officers 
from 9 different nations to work together was a challenge. Gathering officers from NATO 
member countries, from neutral countries and from former Warsaw Pact countries and 
make them co-operate when there is not a common language and different procedures 
and regulations exist, was not designed to happen smoothly. 
This is the opinion of one of the American officers: " Although the "official" 
language of the brigade was English, it was important that not everyone spoke English at 
the same level of proficiency. Daily intelligence briefings, fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) 
and operation orders (OPORDs) from the brigade headquarters were not always clear and 
precise. It was crucial to remember that communications frustrations went both ways and 
that everyone labored under the burden of the communications barrier. We learned to ask 
about anything questionable. Although written orders and reports were, at times, worded 
a little unusually, the actual call-for-fire format was the same. Although we never had to 
fire mission, there would have been very little misunderstanding of when/how to do it if 
we had." 57 
56
 Artur Bilski, "Widok na Sarajewo", p. 31. 
57
 Captain Jonathan E. Howerton commander of Howitzer Battery (M198) 3d Squadron , 2d Armored 
Cavalery Regiment in the Nordic-Polish Brigade deployed in Bosnia -Herzegovina, 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb. 
33 
"Language problems were also evident in Polish Battalion during the operations. 
An English proficiency at the 3-level proved inadequate for staff officers operating in the 
field; either at NORDPOL Beigade HQ at Doboj, where 21 and 38 officers served during 
IFOR and SFOR respectively- or at the Nordic-Support Group in Pecs, Hungary. In 
addition, language deficiencies appeared at the battalion level, where it was discovered 
that privates and/or NCO switchboard operators needed English language training."58 
The Polish Ministry of Defense is now making great efforts to have all commanders 
possess at least a 4-level language proficiency. 
The language barrier had positive and negative consequences. At this point it was 
also a difference in staff procedures. Looking at the positive aspects nobody could take 
anything for granted. It was better to slow down the pace. Having different cultural 
backgrounds also made the Brigade stronger since the staff could team up and look at a 
matter from different angles. 
The NPB operational establishment was roughly 2800 soldiers plus 200 US troops 
working for the brigade in different staffs. The NordPol BDE had also one United States 
Field Artillery Battery from the 3rd US Field Artillery Regiment to provide direct support 
to its area of responsibility. This battery had eight 155 millimeters Ml09 self-propelled 
howitzers. There was also a U.S. Fire Support Detachment from Pennsylvania Army 
National Guard. All together about 220 US personnel were attached to the Nordic-Polish 
Bde. In June 1998, the artillery was withdrawn, due to reductions in the US contribution. 
At the same time, the NordPol BDE took responsibility for a larger AOR.59 
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D.       SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE 
"Intelligence requirements in Bosnia varied depending upon phase of operation 
but consistently required expertise in military, political, cultural, and economic issue 
areas. The information environment was complex and consisted of numerous, non- 
traditional sources. The major challenge was leveraging information from these sources 
which were varied as Public Affairs, Civil Affairs, Military Police, Political Advisors, 
UN organizations, Joint Commissions, Government Agencies, Non-Government and 
Private Volunteer Organizations, Joint Commissions. The databases therefore had to be 
flexible enough to quickly respond to requirements from the commanders as well as a 
wide range of other consumers."60 
The Nordic - Polish Brigade had its own intelligence data collected through 
different sources but it also, as a part of American Task Force Eagle sector, was supposed 
to rely on US intelligence data. The bulk of the US intelligence system supporting 
JJFOR/SFOR were designed for go-to-war, not peace, operations. However, not all 
intelligence information collected in the theatre was releasable to BFOR/SFOR. "Some 
recent operations, such as in Bosnia, have involved military operations with nations about 
which the United States still harbors lingering suspicions, such as Russia or the Ukraine. 
In these cases, the need to share intelligence, not only for the sake of the operation but to 
ensure that military partners in the operation are not put in a position where their actions 
or inactions prove to be dangerous to U.S. troops."61 
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Some of the information shared with the Russian Brigade, which was also in U.S. 
Division Sector, leaked to the Serbs. I remember one officer complaining that Russian 
officers put their military vehicle almost in front of US Division Headquarters in Tuzla 
to collect signals intelligence. Unfortunately, that situation influenced to some degree the 
Nordic-Polish Brigade, and created certain difficulties. Denmark and Norway were 
NATO members but not Poland, Sweden or Finland and this caused limited access to the 
NATO collected information. 
During the mission, there were four levels of sharing intelligence information 
(national, IFOR/SFOR, NATO, US) and that was unacceptable. It was stated by the Task 
Force Eagle that it was: "one team, one mission" but when it comes to sharing 
intelligence information the situation was totally different. It seemed that the Brigade was 
acting in the same mission but as a different team. Just look at some basic facts. The 
brigade was not authorized to get information from the reconnaissance flights of U.S. 
planes due to classification. The brigade was not a prioritized unit because the NordPol 
was not a U.S. unit. 62 
It had been also frustrating to the Nordic-Polish Brigade staff that the TFE staff 
had used US procedures and not NATO ones in the operations and that the U.S. wanted 
every nation to follow their way of doing business. The great disadvantage, according to 
staff officers of the BDE, was that even decisions of minor importance had to be taken to 
a high level in the chain of command. The system was rigid and inflexible and lacked the 
ability to delegate authority concerning decision making down to brigade level. This 
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delayed staff work and caused a lot of unnecessary bureaucracy. Micro management did 
not work in the intelligence world in the Nordic-Polish Brigade area. 
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IV.    THE OPERATIONAL ISSUES OF THE NORDIC-POLISH 
BRIGADE 
A.       THE MISSION IN THE AREA 
The peacekeeping mission of the brigade meant "an activist role (military, 
civilian, or both) involving diplomatic negotiations, conferences, early warning 
procedures, mediation, conflict resolution, and preventive diplomacy techniques to avoid 
or resolve a conflict or initiate a peace process."63 
The Nordic-Polish Brigade organization was from the beginning focused on 
compliance with the mission but also focused on logistics. One of the NordPol's main 
tasks was to control Entity Armed Forces' (EAF) weapons and ammunition storage sites. 
This was carried out by frequent inspections. Most of these inspections were done on a 
routine basis and site commanders were warned in advance. 
After one year it was obvious that the BDE forces were to small to control the 
vast area of responsibility (AOR). To solve these tasks, the NPB had chosen a concept of 
operation that took advantage of the strength of our organization to minimize the 
weaknesses. There was a need for more infantry and less logistics units. The area of 
responsibility was around 4896 square km. 
This area was a mix of narrow terrain with hills and a lot of forest. This terrain 
was very heavily mined which created additional difficulties for the brigade soldiers. 
There were about 3300 recognized minefields and a large number of unknown ones. The 
most difficult problem was that the mine field registers are missing, if there ever existed. 
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As a part of the IFOR/SFOR NPB the military tasks were: 
Optimize force protection 
Patrolling 156 km Zone of Separation (ZOS) and counter violations to the 
peace agreement 
Monitoring Entity Armed Forces' (EAF) training and movement activities 
Monitoring EAF's weapons and ammunition storage sites and confiscation 
of unauthorized weapons 
Enforcement of restrictions of EAF training 
Maintain freedom of movement 
Support the civil implementation of civil aspects of the peace process 
Monitor mine lifting operations 
B.       THE FORCE PROTECTION 
According to Larry Wentz "the threats in Bosnia were real. Three former warring 
factions, not only with significant combat power but also with robust intelligence 
collection capabilities, were waiting for the arrival of NATO forces and it was not clear 
how they might react to the IFOR deployment. The FWF also had a propaganda and 
misinformation campaign in operation and targeted against IFOR. Terrorist, organized 
crime, and petty criminals were also part of the threat. Finally, minefields were numerous 
and added risk to deployed personnel."64 
An especially dangerous situation was in the area of the Nordic-Polish Bde. 
Human Rights Watch/Helsinki stated in its report that "unsubstantiated information from 
early May 1996 indicates, that the Bosnian Serb municipal leadership of Doboj and 
Teslic agreed in late April to plan possible attacks against single IFOR vehicles and foot 
patrols, operating off the main roads in Doboj and Teslic by unidentified elements. 
According to the information, the municipal leadership agreed that IFOR vehicles are to 
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be destroyed by explosives and foot patrols are to be surrounded, disarmed, beaten and 
chased from the area."65 
Force protection was the number one priority of the IFOR/SFOR mission. This 
caused a different outcome within different national units, but the NPB throughout this 
period was on a low state of alert given the general calmness of the situation. American 
soldiers and units within the BDE had followed US Force Protection measures given by 
the Division Task Force Headquarters in Tuzla. 
For example, NPB forces had been allowed to drive in one vehicle alone, going 
out of camps in small groups where one person was armed, drinking limited amounts of 
alcohol when not on duty, doing PT outside of camp and eating at local restaurants. This 
had been done within a US led Division where all US units had to go in 4 vehicle 
convoys, always under a high state of alert and dress code, and not allowed to leave the 
camp. This kind of "freedom" for the NPB soldiers allowed them the opportunity to 
become familiar with Bosnia, show their presence and also to some extent, allowed them 
the opportunity contact with the local population. 
This also had given the battalions a chance to talk to the local population and to 
i listen to their problems and also explain the mission of the BDE. This advantage had 
been successfully used by the NPB concept of operation by assisting the entities while 
talking to each other both on the local and official level. The mostly quiet period the BDE 
experienced in this very tumultuous and tense area partly resulted from the way in which 
the NPB was handling the situation. The entities generally trusted NPB, and supported its 
presence in the area. 
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The Nordic-Polish Bde's perception of force protection was slightly different than 
the American one which was noticed by the American analysts saying: "In Tuzla, 
American members of SFOR could go off base only on official business, and had to do so 
wearing protective vests and helmets and carrying weapons. This led to morale problems 
as they saw military members from other countries going into town off-duty and doing so 
without the heavy protective equipment."66 
In addition, contact with the local populace is one of the critical components of a 
peace operation, and American forces may need to consider changing their policies in 
light of the diminished threat and the overall needs of the mission. On the other hand, the 
American forces' presence is more inviting due to their visibility. One Air Force NCO at 
Tuzla Air Base referred to a national flag displayed from a Nordic-Polish Brigade vehicle 
as the "don't bother shooting me, I'm not an American".67 
C.        CONTROLLING THE ZONE OF SEPARATION (ZOS) 
The Nordic-Polish Bde was always highly visible in the ZOS. The brigade started 
with 5 permanently manned checkpoints. The job of the soldiers deployed in the 
checkpoints was to search for weapons in the vehicles and people crossing the Inter 
Entity Boundary Line (DEBL). The soldiers during their duty were confiscating many 
weapons. The presence of Serb police in the zone of separation was a constant problem. 
They had established a system to police activity that gave them control over the traffic. 
They were issuing visas and taking payment from non-Serbs. 
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Sometimes people from other entities were fined or arrested on very minor 
offenses and payment was demanded on the spot. Serb police were also threatening the 
people crossing the ZOS so they would not dare to come back. The goal was clear. They 
wanted to make the IEBL an international border. That was a problem not only related to 
the Serb side. The Federation police had been doing the same to a limited extent. Both 
parties were continuing to use many resources to patrol the ZOS by means of police and 
other officials dressed as civilians. 
The Serb authorities were opposed to any Bosniacs and Croat movement in the 
Serb controlled area, and also acted to stop Serbs traveling to the Federation. "A number 
of Serbs in Teslic who attempted to travel to the Federation have told our researchers that 
they were unable to get permits because they were denied proper documents by the local 
police. According to IPTF (International Police Task Force) source, "Serbs have been 
given numerous excuses for why they can't travel; for instance-they (the police) had run 
out of the proper forms or that only a limited number of permits can be issued a day, 
etc.68 
After some time, when it turned out that situation was stabilizing, the BDE 
decided to close down all the checkpoints except for one, which was the bridge over the 
Usora River. The presence on this bridge was kept because it was vital for IFOR/SFOR 
movements and if the bridge were blown up, freedom of movement would have been 
severely hampered. 
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After closing permanently manned checkpoints, the BDE changed its presence in 
the ZOS to mobile operations as used in the AOR. This transition went smoothly, and 
freed resources have given the NPB the chance to patrol more intensively the whole ZOS. 
D.       HANDLING THE RETURNEES PROBLEMS 
The first challenge facing the Nordic-Polish Bde was to make the returnee issues 
manageable. The scale of the returnee problem in the area of responsibility was huge. 
"While the total number of returnees in Bosnia was often counted at 300,000 to 400,000 
the Bde had focused on the returnees in the Doboj/MND (Multinational Division North). 
That was about 50,000 people. The G-5 section further defined the problem by narrowing 
it to the minority return (meaning Bosnia's return to Bosnian areas and Serbs to Serb 
ones) into the ZOS (zone of separation). Most of that process was left in the hands of the 
local municipality's authority with just a minimum involvement of the SFOR and Nordic- 
Polish Bde in that case."69 
Consequently the BDE was able to focus on a group of minority/ZOS specific 
return affecting as few as "3,000 to 5,000 people resulting from International Housing 
Commission's (IHC) approved applications. Careful definition of the returnee challenge 
was the vital step in the effective management of the problem as a whole. The BDE had 
to create a secure and safe environment in which there was no violence, and in which 
returns can go orderly and peacefully."70 
To deal with the return problem, the ZOS Office of High Representative (OHR) 
established the IHC consisting of 4 member organizations namely the International Police 
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Task Force (IPTF), OHR, SFOR and United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR). The IHC was activated in October 1996 in order to speed up the return 
process, which was stalled at that time. Another purpose of the IHC was to fulfill the 
intentions of Annex 7, Article II to GFAP: "The Parties shall provide all possible 
assistance to refugees and displaced persons and work to facilitate their voluntary return 
in a peaceful, orderly and phased manner, in accordance with the UNHCR repatriation 
plan." 
While the Dayton Accords theoretically guarantee the right of people to return to 
their former homes, reality has proven to be far different. While the Bosniaks have 
proven generally speaking to be cooperative in carrying out the returning process, the 
Serbs have bitterly opposed any resettlement. When the process started local leaders 
organized "spontaneous protest" of local people. Actually it was not difficult because the 
hatred between Bosnian Serbs and Muslims and Croats was so deep that it was quite easy 
to call people and arrange a riot. The most dangerous situation happened when explosives 
were detonated in the houses, which were supposed to be resettled by Muslims or Croats 
in the zone of separation.71 
Unfortunately Bosniacs themselves also made that process difficult and 
inefficient. They should be blamed to some degree because they had chosen the area that 
had strategic importance and priority in the Nordic - Polish area of responsibility such as 
the Doboj neighborhood. "Whole process of resettlement was orchestrating by Bosnians 
leaders. It happened once that they sent a group of "resettles" which turned out to be the 
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soldiers, pretending to be resettles. Some people were simply paid to go to the areas of 
prime strategic importance for Bosnian authorities."72 
"The Muslims strategy was to resettle people into these areas and after that take 
the rule over Doboj and the whole Ozren area. Doboj was part of a Muslim strategy to 
gradually cut up small pieces of the Republika Srbska territory without fighting. 
However, since the main areas of resettlement were of critical importance for Serbs, they 
used all available measures to campaign against Muslim resettlement. Several houses 
were blown up in the areas were Muslims planned to return. The Serbs were unable to 
find the perpetrators. Radio and newspapers were trying to convince Muslims that when 
they return, no one would be able to protect them and this could be dangerous for their 
life." 73 
Such a situation undermined the resettlement process. This kind of situation of 
"forced resettlement "required a high degree of flexibility and creative thinking from the 
Brigade staff. In order to deal proactively with this issue, the Brigade staff together with 
International Organizations (IOs), developed the Minority Return Plan (MRP), which 
provided the parties a minimum of procedures and other measures to facilitate a peaceful 
and orderly return. The plan also pointed out the responsibility between the local 
authorities and IOs. This provided a good foundation to bring the interested parties to the 
Brigade Headquarters for the first time since the war started so the former enemies were 
at least able to discuss resettlement issues. 
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Despite BDE intelligence cell predictions of large-scale returns in 1997, it 
gradually became clear that the political/strategic climate was not yet conductive to this 
type of activity. Faced with this reality, the BDE clarified its position with regard to 
returns in the area of responsibility (AOR). The BDE internal plan for resettlement stated: 
Questions surrounding the likelihood of returns in the NORDPOL AOR were irrelevant 
to the BDE. The BDE was only concerned that, if returns should occur, that they be 
coordinated (phased) peaceful and orderly. 
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V.      CIVIL - MILITARY COOPERATION OF THE BDE 
A.       CHALLENGES AND DEMANDS OF CIMIC 
According to Nordic-Polish Bde G-5 section "the need of some kind of civil- 
military cooperation was recognized a long time ago. Indeed, the Americans formed " 
civil affairs" units as early as 1942. The Scandinavian countries have included 
humanitarian tasks in their UN peacekeeping operations throughout the world from the 
very beginning in the late 1950s. The ambitions and the readiness of the international 
community to tackle problematic multidimensional conflicts have increased in the 1990s. 
The lessons learned show rather clearly, that the mere traditional use of military assets is 
not sufficient."74 
Civil - military activities prior to the mission in Bosnia were very narrowly 
conceived by NATO and were generally regarded as "rear area" activities associated with 
host-nation logistic support and alleviating refugee interference with military operations. 
The main goal and essence of the IFOR/SFOR mission was to maintain a safe and 
secure environment so that reconciliation could take place. Since mission 
accomplishment depended upon effective civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), such 
cooperation and the CIMIC organizational element, in particular, became a vital "front 
line" asset. "In peacekeeping missions, there is no clear distinction between peace and 
war. As a result, interaction and communication between a mission's civilian and military 
components must be continuous." 75 
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"Civil - military Co-operation (CIMIC) has thus become an important component 
in a peacekeeping operation. It can help a commander to deal with local authorities 
(including local "spoilers" in the peace process) , it can help a commander work with 
international civilian resources essential to overall mission success, and it can assist in 
supporting and preserving military assets by freeing soldiers from non- military 
responsibilities."76 
In Bosnia, the military part of the GFAP has been implemented in the area of 
brigade responsibility. The separation of warring forces and the implementation of the 
military aspects of the Peace Agreement were one of the vital goals of the IFOR mission. 
In December 1996, the IFOR changed to the SFOR. The IFOR mission had already been 
accomplished as there were no military fights among warring factions, and the new 
SFOR started. The priority of the SFOR was to sustain what already had been 
accomplished in putting into action the GFAP civil aspects. As attention to military 
matters of the region lessened, the implementation of the various civil aspects of the 
Peace Agreement became a priority. 
The consequences were that the responsibility of officers working in the area of 
the G-5 section became more important and vital when it comes to good relations with 
local leaders. However, such a situation required from the staff officers working on 
CIMIC matters considerable experience with the civilian area for which they were not 
trained. "Civil-military co-operation has come long way, but it is by no means wrinkle- 
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free. CIMIC still needs to be made more comprehensive. There is also still some distrust 
and misgivings to be overcome on the part of both NGOs and the military"77 
"Officers who had only experience in dealing with soldiers and military life had 
difficulties to handle matters with the local authorities that was leading to 
misunderstandings in the area of both local and international organization. Since civilians 
did not respond to orders and were often representing anti-military attitude the staff 
officers of civil-military cells both in the Brigade and battalion level required some 
additional training."78 
The responsibility of the G-5 (CIMIC - Civil - Military Cooperation) section was 
very diverse and had tremendous importance to the successful completion of this peace- 
supporting mission. The level of interaction between the brigade and the local population 
and its leaders was much higher and more intensive than in the wartime scenario. Actions 
taken by the G-5 cell were covering different areas specified as follows79: 
Returnee questions, minority and majority problems in respective "hot 
spots" 
Elections 
Cooperation with the International Community 
Cooperation with local authorities and social patrolling 
Humanitarian projects as a part of force protection 
B.        ELECTION 
The election was a very important part of the Dayton Accord and was supposed to 
create new Bosnian leaders who would be able to lead the country to a democratic future 
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with the assistance and help of the international community. NordPol, supported the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's (OSCE) efforts to administer the 
country's first ever democratic national elections. Through careful planning and the 
execution of every mission, the soldiers of the multi-national allies had continued to 
monitor the militaries of the former combatants and provide a climate of stability in the 
war-torn land of Bosnia. 
The local authorities via Local Elections Committees were responsible for 
conducting the elections. The international community designated OSCE to supervise the 
election to be carried out orderly in accordance with democratic regulations. The 
IFOR/SFOR was in turn responsible for creating a secure environment so the election 
could take place at all. That meant wide cooperation of military officers with the local 
and international community in order to coordinate various types of military activity. The 
NPB appointed liaison officers to the OSCE in Banja Luka and the Tuzla Regional 
Center as well as to the Prnjavor, Doboj, Tuzla, Srebrenik and Zenica Field Offices. 
The liaison officer of the NPB contacted the OSCE offices at least once a week or 
more often if needed. The units of the NPB supported the OSCE by filling out Voter 
Registration Center (VRC) and Polling Station (PS), and especially checking the exact 
grid references of different locations. The Nordic-Polish Brigade was responsible for 
securing voting stations and free access to roads for all minorities. 
"OSCE had to rely heavily on the IFOR/SFOR otherwise it would not be able to 
fulfill its tasks."80 While working with the representatives of the OSCE, some problems 
emerged because only a few of OSCE personnel had any military background and they 
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had good basic knowledge of their job and the circumstances." The others were rather in- 
experienced with no military training. So there was not much understanding among them 
of military jargon and abbreviation and the civilians were embarrassed and shy to ask for 
explanation. Such a situation required using a "common language".81 
Misunderstanding caused a lot of problems. The most important matters were 
agreed upon in writing. The meaning of the key words was defined in the documents. The 
people representing the international community working in the AOR of the NPB were 
civilians. Due to the diffuse nature of the NGO community, the military often was 
confused when trying to figure out who is in charge, what organizational structure is 
present in-country, or how the civilian chain-of-command, if one exists, functions. 
What had been noticed was that the NGO 's people were very motivated but not 
often mission-oriented. Consequently, while the military person sees an objective and 
plan carefully, the civilians in the IOs were suffering from a lack of central coordination 
between the international organizations working in the area. 
Part of effective communications between the military and NGO community is 
ensuring that each understands what the other is saying. Communicating and sharing 
information with the NGOs/IOs was a new experience for the multinational Bde and 
NATO itself. The humanitarian relief organizations bring with them cultural and 
language differences that need to be understood and dealt with by the military in order to 
avoid misunderstandings, unnecessary competition, and mistrust.    Unfortunately, the 
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need for cooperation between IOs and military was not fully appreciated by the military 
at the outset. Also many civilian agencies such as the OHR were consumed with 
problems in setting up their own organizations and cooperation with the IFOR/SFOR was 
not their main concern. 
C.  SOCIAL PATROLLING AND CONTACTS WITH THE LOCAL 
POPULATION 
A critical part of the Civil-Military Cooperation cell of the NPB involved 
activities contributing to force protection for the brigade. The strategy was to keep up 
good communications and relations with local leaders and local populations. In order to 
do that the Bde initiated the program of "social patrols" as well as hosting numerous 
meetings between local officials from both parties. "Social patrolling" involved visiting 
"hot spots" areas such as potential resettlement sites and points of special, interest to 
monitor the situation and obtain the opinions, viewpoints, and other information from 
local residents. "This kind of Bde activity often provided the commanding officer with 
crucial data regarding such sensitive issues like potential tensions in the area, areas 
designated for resettlement, gravesites visits and other possible problems. "82 
To improve communication with the civilian leaders of the local entities the 
Nordic-Polish Bde hosted numerous meetings, many of which included representatives 
from both sides. These meetings although sometimes difficult and hard improved 
significantly the degree of communication and understanding between the entities. These 
meetings also resulted in the peaceful resolution of several potentially dangerous 
situations without incident. Additionally, direct liaison and communication with local 
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officials on both sides was instrumental in the excellent working relationship between 
NPB and the entities. 83 
D.       HUMANITARIAN PROJECTS 
On a very personal level, members of the NORDPOLBDE have been making 
practical contributions to restoring civic order since the operation started, and in some 
cases, even before the arrival of the IFOR. The Swedish Battalion has spent the last four 
years assisting in the Tuzla region, providing equipment to schools and hospitals, and 
offering food to displaced persons. In Doboj, home of the Brigade Headquarters, the 
Danisg Battalion donated fresh potatoes and worked on schools. The Finnish 
Construction Battalion had a crew of 400 plumbers, electricians, and carpenters, skilled 
in vertical and horizontal tasking and made their services available. In fact, all the 
countries represented under the Brigade corporate logo have shed the soldier suits to help 
the local population. As often is the case, though, money remains a real obstacle to 
proffering humanitarian aid.84 
Later, the situation had changed. "The Infrastructure and 
Rehabilitation/Reconstruction Projects" had started. "To foster the reconstruction 
process, the EC is assisting in small scale, quickly implemented projects at a local level. 
It helps to encourage cooperation and trust and has immediately visible results and 
benefits for the local population. Consequently, the EC also fosters the implementation of 
its small-scale operations programme and SFOR micro projects."85 
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"The Infrastructure and Rehabilitation/Reconstruction Projects" were intended to 
be used as a means to improve or increase Brigade and IFOR/SFOR force protection by 
showing the local population that the military forces also support the local population's 
transition to peace and normality. The NORDPOLBDE participated in so called 
Community Infrastructure and Reconstruction Projects (CIRP) Phase I was administrated 
and directed by the U.S. Division Task Force Eagle. 
For example, in the period from January to June 1996, the NPB submitted 56 
projects of which eight were approved, but only four were actually activated and 
executed. The last four were never inplemented put into life due to the lack of funding. 
Unfortunately it become soon evident that the projects within the NordPol area of 
responsibility were not a priority so the CIRP Phase I was finally terminated on 31 
December 1996. 86 
The consequence of such a situation was the high expectations of the local 
communities, which were never fulfilled. Mistrust resulted when no projects were 
approved and no money for the municipality arrived. Also, the approval process created 
some confusion. For instance, the Task Force Eagle approved projects on level one which 
is the Division level and informed the NPB which again informed municipal authorities. 
However, the approvals at the TFE level only meant the projects were eligible for 
submission to the USAJD in Sarajevo for final approval. Projects had in general a 
maximum funding limit per project or US AID CIRP - $50,000.87 
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The final result was that the local authorities were told their project applications 
were approved at level one which raised their expectations, but in the end none of the 
projects were funded. So, a dangerous situation was created when the credibility of civil- 
military relations between the Brigade and local communities was undermined. The press 
and information sections were often asked during the press conferences why particular 
projects were not carried out or what other projects the NPB was going to implement. 
It created misunderstanding and mistrust when the projects already accepted were 
never executed. The politics of the "stick and carrot "was unsuccessful to some degree 
and had some impact on BDE credibility. Due to these experiences, the NPB was not so 
willing to develop further cooperation in this area with the Task Force Eagle Division 
based in Tuzla. 
Looking to improve the situation, the NPB found out that the European Union 
was financing projects within the MNDs composed of military forces from member 
states. Among the Nordic-Polish Brigade there were three member states of the EU: 
Denmark, Sweden and Finland. G-5 sections rewrote all the projects which were rejected 
by the USAID and submitted them to the European Commission through SFOR HQ in 
Sarajevo. 62 projects were approved and each project was worth approximately 40.000 
DEM.88 NPB communicated also with different nations Foreign Ministries through the 
Defense Ministries applying for funds to specially targeted resettlement areas related to 
the "Minority Return Plan." 
The military part of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) or as it 
is also called the " Dayton Peace Agreement" had   been implemented in the Nordic- 
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Polish Bde area of responsibility with full cooperation with all party's forces. The NPB 
had created a peaceful and secure environment for the civilian part to be implemented, 
however, they regretfully lagged behind. There were different reasons for this but the 
most important seems to be the donor countries 's use of concessions. They were often 
attaching strings to the aid offered which led to unequal support provided to the 
Federation and the Serb's Republic. Unfortunately, the Nordic-Polish Brigade did not 
have any control over this situation. 
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VI.    PRESS AND INFORMATION SECTION 
A.       MEDIA AS A PLAYER 
Major General William L. Nash, the NATO commander in the American- 
controlled sector of Bosnia In 1996, following his retirement from the army, said to a 
journalist," The art of good reporting is to seduce the subject. The art of the military 
commander is to seduce the reporter."89 Such a role was mostly played by the PIO's 
officers. 
In today's high technology environment, information is a very important factor, 
which may decide the success or failure of a military operation. The "CNN 
effect"(unsubstantiated media reports), coupled with the "information revolution", 
created formidable challenges for the military. In Bosnia, there was a media presence 
throughout the country when IFOR arrived. The information networks serving the media, 
the IFOR, and its coalition member nations provided the ability to share information at a 
speed and efficiency never before experienced.90 
In some areas, especially those controlled by the Serbs, the IFOR was a target in a 
propaganda campaign, and a misinformation campaign was in full operation when the 
first international troops arrived on the scene. The problem then was how to change the 
situation in order to diminish the anti IFOR/SFOR propaganda. 
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The main task of the Press and Information section in the Nordic-Polish Brigade 
was to give a correct picture of the NPB within the AOR. To increase the interest of 
home countries, a homepage was created and published on the Internet. 
The mission of the P&I Section was to91: 
• Generate public understanding and support for the SFOR mission in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 
• Advise to the Commanding Officer in P& I matters 
• Inform the public on the peace stabilization process 
B.       DEALING WITH THE LOCAL MEDIA 
For most of the local journalist, the section they were dealing with had been 
involved in propaganda activity during the war and they were very much dependent on 
their political sponsors. Thus there were no chance for objectivity in the media since it 
was   strictly supervised by the political leaders of Mr. Radovan Kardzic's party SDS 
(Serb Democratic Part). Additionally the unemployment in the Republika Srbska was 
almost 90 per cent and the working journalist compared to the rest of the people were, at 
least, paid for their job. However, at the same time, they were tools in the hands of 
political parties owing the media. 
There were many cases of journalists on both sides being threatened. In 
most cases, this was successful and journalists became a tool in the politicians hands. 
However, it was not easy and actually it is still not easy to be an independent journalist in 
Bosnia - Herzegovina. I remember one case of Azemina Muhamedovic. She was a 
journalist for the "Oslobodjenije" newspaper and worked in Tesanij. Before that she was 
a head of the local radio station in that Muslim city. She was dismissed from that job by 
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the influential Minister of Interior Affairs of the Doboj - Zenica canton Semsudin 
Mehmedovic. 
Asemina Muhamedovic stated latter to me that "he insisted on me to publish the 
information which was convenient for the ruling party. I did not want to and I was forced 
to leave. Afterwards my husband was beaten up by unknown people. I have no doubt. 
That was the warning directed to me. Semsudin Mehmedovic wanted to subordinate the 
press in order to have control over the black market in the area. "92 
The same situation or even worse occurred in the Srbska Republic. However, 
there, those who did not want to follow the official party line and published independent 
articles or tried to be objective were harassed in many ways. Their cars or homes were 
blown up or unknown people were throwing bombs into the newspaper's office.- 
The Press and Information Section weekly was handling one joint press 
conference, which all journalists were attending. The problem was that some of the 
journalists were twisting the information given by the spokesman of the Brigade in the 
way that propaganda goals were established before. The press conferences for Serb 
journalists were held downtown in Doboj in the former Federal Yugoslav Army's 
building. The atmosphere of the press conference was very stressful especially during the 
first phase of the IFOR mission. 
C.       PROPAGANDA WAR 
However, the most important information to deal with was the external 
information for local media to increase the force protection. Local Serb media was hostile 
toward the Brigade. The journalists were simply forced to lie but most of them did it on 
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purpose because they had to believe the ideology they were disseminating. Especially 
hostile was the local Radio Doboj run by editor in chief Milenko Gligoric who had no 
professional experience as a journalist. Mr. Milenko Gligoric was the ultra - nationalist 
and hard-line vice president of the SDS (Serb Democratic Party) in Doboj and as 
mentioned previously, head of the only radio station in the area, Radio Doboj. Gligoric 
was "uncompromising in his views that ethnic co-existence between Serbs and non-Serbs 
is not possible and completely unacceptable." 
During and after the war, Gligoric gave speeches on Radio Doboj in which he 
encouraged the Bosnian Serbs to expel all Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats from Doboj. In 
1993 Gligoric began a campaign informing all non-Serbs in Doboj that they should 
convert to Orthodox Christianity and personally drove around the area with a mounted 
loudspeaker propagating his policy. He was especially influential in the historically 
nationalist Ozren region south of Doboj.93 
Radio Doboj was a state owned enterprise totally controlled by the SDS. The 
SDS party was led by the war criminal Radovan Kardzic who was wanted by the UN. 
The range of the radio was quite large so it might been listened to at least several 
kilometers from the city of Doboj. The advantage of having this radio station in SDS 
hands was obvious to all. To give an example of Radio Doboj "news" I quote two 
examples. One comes from 11 August 1997 the head of Radio Doboj states: 
The fourth anniversary of the day when Doboj was defended in the Pridjel 
area was celebrated in the village of Pridjel yesterday. Paying the post 
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mortal respect to the 21 villagers who got killed in the battle, Radenko 
Marie, Commander of the Pridjel Unit said that during the Operation 
"Jump", the enemy, coming from Tesanj, had tried to cut off Ozren and 
surround the Doboj town. Some parts of the Pridjel were surrounded by 
the enemy. "We had some of our soldiers killed, but we did not abandoned 
the position," Marie said. Milenko Gligoric, president of the Pridjel Local 
Community (Managing Director of Radio Doboj), said on the occasion: 
"In this war, we lost 20 men and one woman, our sister Cvijeta. We must 
always remember their sacrifices. We have to stay united. The war against 
the Serb nation is still going on, now, in peace. With our interior traitors" 
assistance, our enemy is trying to cheat us. This war in peace is more 
dangerous than the previous one when we fought with weapons in our 
hands. Let us save our unity, let us vote for RS. You know quite well who 
is trying to save this first Serb state. If they, that scum of this world, who 
act as the International Community, manage to cheat us now, if they get us 
on our knees now, then the two centuries of our righteous fight for 
freedom will be annihilated.94 
The other information is from 10 July 1997 and was broadcast on Radio Doboj 
every hour during the news the same day when British special forces SAS carried out a 
special operation to arrest suspected war criminals. During the action one was 
successfully arrested and the other was killed, he Radio also send a letter to the 
Commander of the Nordic-Polish Bde titled: 
On the occasion of Simo Drljaca's murder, and arrest of several citizens of 
Serb nationality in Prijedor and other areas of Republic of Srbska: "We are 
shocked with the news that the international terrorists on Thursday 
forenoon, savagely liquidated the legend of Prijedor area and Serb hero 
Simo Drljaca, arrested his closest relatives and taken them away to 
unknown direction. Is that a democracy, which you propagate through 
CNN, BBC, DW, RFE, etc? Is that the Dayton Agreement in which the 
World represented through international organizations is swearing in? 
Does the "International forces for peace stabilization", shortly "SFOR", 
"stabilize" the peace by killing innocent people, who are fishing on the 
riverside by which they grew up? No, it is not democracy. That is fascism 
worse than Mussolini's and Hitler's one. Serb Radio-Doboj widely opened 
its radio waves to, now already so-called "Force for peace stabilization". 
Even when it had a reason to criticize, very often it had not done that, due 
to thinking that in that way it will benefit to better understanding between 
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Serbs and the World. But that, obviously and after all, was in vain. 
Because of this, the Staff of Serb Radio-Doboj decided to cancel its 
hospitality to SFOR members on its radio waves, and to remove the 
"Most" broadcast from its program. The bridges are destroyed, not by our 
fault, and will they be restored again, who knows. One way or another, 
they will never be as passable as they were until now.95 
The local newspapers in the area like "Svitanija", "Glas Srbski" followed the 
Radio Doboj's propaganda path. The Nordic-Polish Brigade were doing many routine 
searches in the ZOS just to find the weapons which were not allowed in the ZOS and to 
prevent any fights with resettles. I took part in many of them so I know that the troops 
behaved as professionally as was possible but never as described in the newspaper. 
In the article titled "A "raid" with no precedent" 96, an author with the initials B. 
T. writes: 
These days, the SFOR has started a large "weapon search" action in the 
Socanica, Derventa area. Without any prior announcements, they have 
been breaking suddenly into people's houses, fumbling the things in hope 
to find " a piece or two of weapon." The locals in Socanica say that SFOR 
soldiers, armed fully and with their guns pointing, are breaking into their 
houses, into bedrooms, bathrooms, all rooms, into stables, pig pens and 
chicken coops even. Not used to the "raids", the children, scared and in 
tears, are rushing to find a shelter in their parents and adult arms. To add 
to this, a seventy year old women says: "We have been through many 
humiliations. We will endure this one too, but God punish who let them do 
this to us. 
Typical propaganda and lack of professionalism: no names of the people he talked 
to, no names of the author. I am quite sure that an author of this story did not talk to any 
people at the spot. He was not even there. 
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Another example comes from "Nezavisne Novine". The article was published on 
8 December and its title is: "Chemical weapon in BiH - the fact hushed down". 
Newspaper is accusing NATO of using in 1995 the uranium bombs during the 
bombardment of Serb positions. 
When NATO started bombing Yugoslavia in March 1999 the Republika Srbska 
newspapers widely quoted Serb leaders. Here are some examples. Voislav Seselj was 
quoted saying: 
Yugoslavia is attacked by the biggest possible crowd of world criminals 
and thugs that history ever knew. The Serb nation will remain united and 
determined to defend the independence, territorial integrity and 
sovereignty of Serbia and Yugoslavia.97 
There are many more examples of this kind simply trying to pull the emotional 
strings of the people without giving them professional and objective information. One 
last example of Serb propaganda against NATO follows. This time even poetry had been 
used in the propaganda struggle. Of course, the author remained nameless. 
A poem against NATO 98 
A full moon is rising, red with blood 
Above Belgrade, where it lingers-full of fear, 
In pain, in spasm. 
A full moon is coming, crying in the wind- 
Yugoslavia-is mourned, 
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Yugoslavia is deep in grief, in a veins piercing grief. 
Washington-is celebrating the bloodshed. 
They are feeding their bellies with blood, 
Men of stone hearts, 
Experts in killing. 
In a most cruel way are the Yankees 
and their servants 
making their own universe of power. 
What right does he speak of, 
From whom is this Cesar 
That speaks only with weapon 
Defending us? 
Propaganda is a feeble foundation of society. Everybody knows this who lived 
under the communist regimes. However, propaganda is still a useful tool to control the 
people's minds. Serb propaganda is mostly based on lies. 
To show the state of mind of the people in the Balkans, it is worth quoting the 
definition of a lie described by Father Jozef Tishner in his article about Stalinism: 
A political lie is an amazing structure, he says; the deeper we get into it, 
the more fascinated we become. It is a beautiful building, full of nooks, 
with extensive corridors, stairs and ladders, surrounded by wild shrubbery 
and manicured alleys. 
You need profound knowledge to find your way in this world. Not everybody is 
allowed to say every lie. There are privilege lies reserved for the privileged and common 
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lies for the commoners. There are lies about past and future. There are also lies about the 
present. These may be especially worth examining, since they deny what everybody can 
see."99 
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Vn.   CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The final chapter of the Nordic - Polish Brigade was closed in January 2000 when 
a significant number of personnel was pulled out and the brigade was renamed the 
Nordic- Polish Battle Group composed of Danish and Polish battalions with small 
Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian detachments. All together 800 soldiers are still serving 
in the Bosnia fulfilling peacekeeping mission.100 
Looking back into the history of this very special Brigade it has, over the years, 
been able to fulfill its tasks, and has reached results from its work far beyond what could 
be expected from a mixture like the Nordic-Polish Brigade. The disadvantages with a 
multinational unit have been turned into advantages and performed in the true spirit of the 
Nordic-Polish Brigade motto: one mission-one team. 
In the beginning there naturally were some problems and misunderstandings 
concerning the overall concept and NATO staff procedures. I remember an opinion of 
staff officer of Nordic-Polish Brigade Maj. Jan Boczkowski. He stated that the culture of 
the Warsaw Pact inculcated, "simply asking questions is seen as a lack of competence. So 
you 'd rather make a mistake than ask a question." 
There were differences among the leading nations: "Dig a little deeper, though the 
cultural divide grows much more apparent. Former Warsaw Pact officers serving in 
SFOR are stunned at the amount of paper and briefing work NATO generates. "The 
American's addiction to churning out computer-generated briefings slides with Microsoft 
100 p0iish pj-ess Agency: http//nato.pap.com.pl/chi/wiad.plx?ID=9765 
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"PowerPoint" software is especially bewildering. While you are making your PowerPoint 
slides we would be killing you," one unimpressed Russian officer scoffed to a NATO 
colleague as they mused about who would win a conventional war. NATO officers, for 
their part, find themselves frustrated by the difficulty the Poles and other former Warsaw 
Pact countries have in grasping the concept of initiative and creativity at the unit 
level"101. 
That was one extreme opinion. However, I think it is worth quoting another one 
from the same article, which is totally opposite of that quoted above. "Western 
commanders praise the work shown by Warsaw Pact troops in the field. The Poles, for 
example, have served in peacekeeping operations from Haiti to Cambodia, and when the 
task is straightforward says a U.S. major in Bosnia, "they are incredibly motivated, and 
they don't jack around with doing stuff. They just do it. I'd rather have Poles then any of 
the (Western) Europeans."102 
Some of the nations were non-NATO nations and were in the process of adapting 
its staff procedures. During the existence of the Brigade there was remarkable change in 
this aspect. Staff people experienced that when were dealing with new operations. Their 
cooperation with national battalions had improved significantly. The cooperation with the 
battalions was special in the aspect that the normal NATO-way is for the Brigade to order 
a battalion to act according to a given order, sometimes without any warning. 
The staff came to a conclusion that this was not the way the international unit 
should work. The Brigade was using another sometimes time consuming concept. The 
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BDE let the BNs participate in the planning process. Another way of getting good 
interoperability was the BDE training plan. Among other problems in the BDE, there was 
language. The weak point of a multinational unit was the language. As I mentioned 
before there were 9 different cultural and language backgrounds. This naturally caused 
some problems. 
Although in the beginning of NATO mission in Bosnia, civil-military relations in 
the Nordic-Polish Brigade were not perceived as vital for the whole mission but it soon 
become clear, when the military part of Dayton Agreement had been accomplished, that 
those must become a priority. The G-5 section was being built up in order to face new 
challenges. 
Understanding and appreciation of the civil-military affairs came later. 
"Widespread civil-military coordination and cooperation did not really occur until the 
May 1996 time frame. The quote Admiral Leighton Smith, COMFOR, "In November we 
never heard of CIMIC. We had no idea what you did. Now we can't live without you".103 
The problem was to get experienced people so they can handle the problems of a 
civilian nature. Actually, there were not so many officers able to handle it so as to solve 
the problems instead of creating new ones. Many of them lacked basic knowledge on 
civil-military relations so they had to learn it while the civil-military cooperation was 
going on which slowed it down and created misunderstandings. The other side of the 
story is that to fulfill fully civil-military cooperation in the NPB area of responsibility, the 
BDE required also strong participation of the International Organizations. 
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"There was no understanding by commanders and staff at all levels of 
IFOR/SFOR of the capabilities, roles, and mission of Civil Affairs units and personnel, 
referred to as Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC). As a result, the military support to the 
humanitarian aspects of the operation was more reactive than proactive, especially during 
the early stages of the operation. "104 
The Danish lessons learned from Nordic- Polish Brigade unit are as follows105: 
• Importance of pre-mission preparation 
• Importance of familiarity with doctrine and procedures used in the mission 
• Multinational integration at battalion level and below can work well in a 
permissive environment provided that necessary input is made and other 
pre-conditions are met 
• The effectiveness generally increases in accordance with national 
homogeneity. Within the permissive environment of SFOR, it was seen 
that organic units of company size or above with their own national 
commander are most effective 
• A hostile environment places the highest priority on faultless command 
and control and produces the greatest challenge for low - level 
multinational formations 
• Commanders need to accept responsibility and to exercise initiative. 
Providing integrated units with their own area of responsibility worked 
well. Units must be stable under stress and able to make decisions. 
• Co-operation, tact, reliability and determination are essential attributes in a 
multinational environment 
• Integration of staff officers in operational positions is of advantage to all 
nations. Placing officers and NCOs in administrative positions and 
integration of individual soldiers is less cost-effective 
• Overlapping host and partner deployments provides continuity, but the 
opportunity for pre-mission training in the higher level formation is lost 
• The formation of liaison and advisory team from the host unit helps 
facilitate successful integration. Effort is required from all levels 




 The North Atlantic Assembly Report, http://www.naa.be/publications/comrep/200/at. 
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• Continuous and feedback enable implementation of lessons learned 
"Increasingly, crisis response operations bring together more and more countries, 
working together. Multinationality is often considered both a military and a political 
necessity - militarily because resources can be combined and specialized skills utilized, 
and politically because it gives greater legitimacy to the operation. In addition, nations 
working together can learn from each other both on the professional as well as on the 
cultural level."106 
There are, of course, problems when many nations working together. Thus, for 
multinationality to be workable and to be able to create optimum solutions, a certain or 
even high degree of community spirit is necessary. First and foremost there must be 
shared ideas, interests and values at the political level. Furthermore, states must constrain 
their behavior with a view to reaching common solutions rather than pursuing narrow 
national interests. In general terms, each state must be able to realize advantages derived 
from international co-operation that are perceived to be greater than if the state did not 
take part. "107 
The Nordic -Polish Brigade is a good example how this cooperation was planned 
and executed. The challenges it faced might be a good lesson learned for future such joint 
missions. This example of multinational cooperation, which proved its importance has 
been now followed by the other common military enterprises like, the recently created, 
South Eastern European Brigade located in Bulgaria composed of Albania, Bulgaria, 
Greece, Romania and Turkey. 
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Overall it was a positive development working in an international environment 
since it gave the individuals inputs from the others and took away from stereotypical 
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